“Captive Bodies as Archives of the Colonial Encounter: Women and Slavery in the History of International Law” The foremost legal characterisation of slavery – what we may call slavery proper – is found in the 1926 Slavery Convention, a treaty aimed at the international prohibition of slavery which came to fruition through the work of an appointed expert commission at the League of Nations. The archives of this period reveal that certain conditions of enslavement were considered a “lesser form” of slavery, where experts and states would attribute them to either cultural custom or practices that restrict the liberty of persons. Such conditions of enslavement were deemed to be outside the bounds of how the League intended to define slavery and, in practical terms, this meant that forms of subjugation primarily affecting women of the Global South were eclipsed by the law. Today, mirroring this decade-old approach, severe forms of subjugation experienced by women commonly fall under the umbrella of ‘modern-day slavery,’ rather than being recognized as historically and legally reflective of slavery proper. Critical works contend with the challenges of delineating an appropriate scope of slavery in and for the present, not least because of the fragmented comprehension of ‘modern-day slavery’ across international law and its institutions. This fragmentation has led to various conditions of enslavement – otherwise closely interlinked – being recast into discrete legal categories (e.g., human trafficking, forced labour, etc.) and regulated through separate treaties. In response to this piecemeal legal landscape, my research undertakes a genealogical inquiry into how slavery has been conceptualized in international law to identify the influencing factors that have informed the legal design of conditions of enslavement. In my work, I attempt to trace the ways in which the law has limited our understanding of what it means to be enslaved, moulded definitions now embedded into social and political life, and generated particular lines of discourse and meaning around subjugating practices. At the heart of the matter is my question as to why we perceive a child who has been forcibly married and subjected to pervasive personal and institutional violence, or a woman who has been trafficked and is bound in forced prostitution, as anything other than slavery proper. Education: LL.M., Osgoode Hall Law School LL.M., McGill University LL.B., Brunel University

“Responsible Artificial Intelligence: Appraising the Prospects for a Binding Norm under International Law” As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes ubiquitous, influencing everything from national security to quotidian life, it presents profound risks to fundamental human rights, such as privacy, non-discrimination, and human dignity. My research seeks to determine how the international legal order is responding to these risks by mapping the evolution of "responsible AI" from proliferating ethical guidelines into potentially binding international law. The study centres on a qualitative analysis of key international organizations. By evaluating their policy formulation and praxis, I seek to appraise the degree of normative convergence across diverse legal landscapes and identify whether a shared global standard for AI governance is emerging. By diversifying the geographical scale of these case studies, the research ensures a comprehensive understanding of norm diffusion that includes traditionally marginalized perspectives from the Global South. Ultimately, this project contributes to the conceptual literature on how international law evolves in response to transformative technological change, offering a framework for understanding the protection of human rights in an increasingly automated global society. Education MPhil, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge LLM/LLB, Oliver Schreiner School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand

"Dehumanisation as strategic narrative in contemporary warfare: challenges for international law" This doctoral project examines the contemporary transformation of armed conflict through the lens of dehumanisation, understood not merely as a discursive phenomenon but as a genuine strategic infrastructure. Drawing on the case study of the Israel Hamas conflict from the Second Intifada to the present, it highlights how dehumanising strategic narratives are integrated into the military doctrines and informational strategies of the belligerents. In a context marked by the emergence of cognitive warfare, these narratives shape perceptions, legitimise the use of violence, and redefine the very categories of the target and the enemy. The thesis thus shows that contemporary warfare extends beyond material confrontation and unfolds within an informational environment in which language becomes a central instrument in the conduct of hostilities. Building on this observation, the research questions the capacity of international law to address these transformations. It argues that existing legal frameworks, largely shaped in the nineteenth century and in the aftermath of the Second World War, struggle to capture forms of violence that are diffuse, continuous, and largely immaterial. Dehumanisation, particularly when embedded within informational and technological architectures and conveyed through strategic narratives, operates both upstream of the law, by influencing the perception of threat and the thresholds for the use of force, and within the law itself, by affecting the implementation of core principles such as distinction and proportionality. By combining doctrinal legal analysis with an empirical approach, the thesis seeks to demonstrate a structural gap between the categories of international law and the contemporary modalities of warfare, and to reflect on how its interpretative frameworks may need to evolve in response. Education Master Political sciences Paris II Pantheon Assas L.LM College of Europe Masters European Law Paris II Pantheon Assas, Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne Bachelor Law University Rennes 1